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Abstract
This paper applies mechanism design to conict resolution. We determine when
and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability
of conict in a game with asymmetric information. Mediation improves upon un-
mediated communication when the intensity of conict is high, or when asymmetric
information is signicant. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication
by not precisely reporting information to conicting parties, and precisely, by not
revealing to a player with probability one that the opponent is weak. Arbitrators
who can enforce settlements are no more eective than mediators who only make
non-binding recommendations.
1 Introduction
Over the years, the formal theory of international relations has much developed the pos-
itive analysis of conict by making use of advanced game theoretical techniques.1 Instead,
the powerful tools of mechanism design have not yet been extensively used to explore which
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1See Jackson and Morelli (2011) for an updated survey of such a positive analysis.
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institutions may be more eective for conict resolution and prevention.2 The revelation
principle, a fundamental result in mechanism design due to Myerson (1979), identies me-
diation as an ecient institution to deal with conicts that arise because of asymmetric
information, one of the main rationalist explanations for wars.3 Indeed, mediation has
played an increasingly important role in the organization of peace talks to resolve recent
international crises. According to the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the
most comprehensive empirical eort to date, 30% of international crises for the entire pe-
riod 1918{2001 were mediated, and the fraction rises to 46% for the period 1990{2001 (see
Wilkenfeld et al., 2005). In a simple model of conict, this paper rst asks when, and how,
mediation improves the ex ante probability of peace with respect to unmediated peace
talks.4 Second, we ask whether arbitration improves on mediation, to explore the relevance
of the power of enforcing settlements in international conict resolution.5
Before describing our specic set up and ndings, we briey motivate our general mod-
elling choices.
In line with the mechanism design literature, we consider unbiased mediators who have
no private information.6 Further, the mediator's objective is the minimization of the ex-ante
2A few papers study mechanism design in international relations (Bester and Warneryd, 2006, and Fey
and Ramsay 2009, 2010); we discuss them later in details. A discussion on the importance of institutional
design for conict or international cooperation is in Koremenos et al (2001).
3Blainey (1988) famously argued that wars begin when states disagree about their relative power and
end when they agree again (see also Brito and Intriligator, 1985, and Fearon, 1995). Wars may arise because
of asymmetric information about military strength, but also about the value of outside options or about
the contestants' political resolve, i.e. about the capability of the leaders and the peoples to sustain war.
For example, it is known that Saddam Hussein grossly under-estimated the US administration political
resolve, when invading Kuwait in 1990.
4The role of communication in reducing the probability of conict due to asymmetric information is
established by Baliga and Sjostrom (2004).
5As well as international conict, the intuition that private information may cause bargaining failures
has been invoked as an explanation for costly trials in the case of litigation, and strikes in the case of wage
bargaining (see Kennan and Wilson, 1993, for an early review). But unlike in international relations, where
nations are sovereign, arbitration is always possible in these contexts; and hence the study of mediation
has not been much developed. Further, most of the analysis has focused on the performance of currently
available arbitration mechanisms in specic game theoretic models, rather than characterizing optimal
arbitration, which is the scope of mechanism design analysis.
6As some scholars claim, \mediator impartiality is crucial for disputants' condence in the mediator,
which, in turn, is a necessary condition for his gaining acceptability, which, in turn, is essential for mediation
success to come about" (see e.g. Young, 1967, and the scholars mentioned in Kleiboer, 1996). On the other
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probability of war. Hence, our mediator must be able to commit to quit in some circum-
stances, instead seeking a peaceful agreement in all contingencies (see Watkins, 1998). Such
commitments, in fact, facilitate information disclosure by the contestants, and ultimately
improve the ex-ante chances of peaceful conict resolution.7 Finally, we study mediators
who have no independent budget for transfers or subsidies, and cannot impose peace to the
contestants. To be sure, third-party states that mediate conict, such as the United States,
are neither unbiased nor powerless; However, single states account for less than a third of
the mediators in mediated conicts (Wilkenfeld, 2005), so that we view our assumption
not only as a useful theoretical benchmark, but also as a reasonable approximation for
numerous instances of mediated crises.
Unlike most of the mechanism design literature, we assume that the mediator's proposals
must be self-enforcing.8 Indeed, countries are sovereign, and enforcement of contracts or
agreements is often impossible in international relations (see e.g. Waltz, 1959).9 This
assumption is formalized by introducing ex post individual rationality constraints requiring
that both contestants nd proposed peaceful settlements more advantageous than starting
conict. In the terminology of Fisher (1995), our mediators perform \pure mediation,"
i.e., they gather information and propose settlements, rather than \power mediation,"
which also involves mediator's power to reward, punish or enforce. In order to describe
the dierence between arbitration and mediation, in the nal section, we relax ex post
individual rationality and introduce standard ex interim individual rationality constraints.
To achieve their objectives, mediators can facilitate communication, formulate propos-
hand, when a mediator possesses independent information that needs to be credibly transmitted, some
degree of bias may be optimal (see Kydd, 2003, Rauchaus, 2006).
7In the nal discussion, we provide some anecdotal evidence supporting our assumption of full mediator's
commitment, which is obviously also one of our normative prescriptions.
8Among the few papers studying self-enforcing mechanisms, see Matthews and Postlewaite (1989),
Banks and Calvert (1992), Cramton and Palfrey (1995), Forges (1999), Compte and Jehiel (2008), and
Goltsman et al. (2009).
9Viewed another way, countries cannot commit not to initiate war if such an attack is a protable devia-
tion from an agreement. In this sense, even if the bargaining problem comes from asymmetric information,
we also have a natural form of commitment problem built in. See Powell (2006) for a recent comprehensive
discussion of the relative importance of asymmetric information and commitment problems in creating
bargaining breakdown.
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als, and manipulate the information transmitted (see Touval and Zartman, 1985, for a
discussion of these three roles; and Wall and Lynn, 1993, for an exhaustive discussion
of all observed mediation techniques). Because we consider unmediated cheap talk as a
benchmark, our mediators can only improve the chances of peace by managing the ow
of information between the parties. In practice, this corresponds to the mediator's role in
\collecting and judiciously communicating select condential material" (Raia, 1982, 108{
109). Obviously, this activity requires private and separate caucuses. Indeed, the practice
of shuttle diplomacy has become popular since Henry Kissinger's eorts in the Middle East
in the early 1970s and the Camp David negotiations mediated by Jimmy Carter, in which a
third party conveys information back and forth between parties, providing suggestions for
moving the conict toward resolution (see, for example, Kydd, 2006). In the real world, me-
diators also often prevent conict by facilitating communication or coordinating discussions
among parties unwilling to communicate without a mediator. Such instances of mediation
correspond to what we formally call unmediated communication. Our paper conrms the
value of mediators as communication facilitators, by showing that communication often
reduces the chance of conict.
Having claried our methodological choices and our general motivation, we now describe
the basic features of our model and then oer a preview of our ndings.
We consider a simple model of conict, in which two players contest xed amount of re-
sources.10 A player cannot observe the opponent's strength, political resolve, or willingness
to ght. Specically, each player is strong (hawk) with some probability and weak (dove)
otherwise. If the two players are of the same type, war is a fair lottery; else, the stronger
wins with higher probability. For simplicity, we assume that all wars are equally costly.11
10This is a standard metaphor for many types of wars, for example related to territorial disputes or to
the present and future sharing of the rents from the extraction of natural resources. Indeed, Bercovitch et
al (1991) show that mediation is useful mostly when the disputes are about resources, territory, or in any
case divisible issues.
11It might be interesting to allow for dierent costs for symmetric and asymmetric wars, but the addi-
tional notational and computational costs appear a heavy price to pay.
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We consider a simple game where the two players simultaneously choose whether to agree
to a given resource split, and war takes place unless both players agree. For any value of
the split, we calculate the equilibrium that maximizes the ex ante chances of peace. Then,
we choose values of the split that maximize the peace chances.12
In order to introduce unmediated communication, we augment our basic model by
letting the peaceful split parameter depend on cheap-talk messages priorly shared by the
players, and on the realization of a public randomization device. Indeed, it is known
that public randomization devices may be reproduced by simultaneous cheap talk (see,
Aumann and Hart, 2003). When war cannot be avoided in our benchmark model, the
optimal separating communication equilibrium is shown to improve on no-communication.
Intuitively, it allows players to reveal their type, and establish type-dependent splits to
avoid conict. However, war cannot be fully avoided.13
We then consider mediated communication. First, the mediator collects the players'
messages privately. Then, she optimally chooses message-dependent split proposals, possi-
bly randomizing.14 Given these denitions, we can now report our main results.
- When does a mediator help? The mediator's optimal solution cannot be worse than
any equilibrium without the mediator. In fact, the mediator could always, trivially,
make the messages she receives public, thereby mimicking the optimal unmediated
communication equilibrium. Further, the mediator strictly improves the peace chance
in two distinct sets of circumstances. First, when the intensity (or cost) of conict is
12One of the mediator's role in our model will be to make peaceful split recommendations after hearing
the players' private report. By selecting the split values that induce equilibria with the highest chance
of peace in our benchmark, we isolate the information management role of the mediator from her split
proposal role.
13In a small parameter region, in which the cost of war is high, the players can improve on the sep-
arating equilibrium, by playing a mixed strategy equilibrium in the cheap talk game. Of course, mixed
strategy equilibria are strictly dominated by mediation, as mixed strategies induce randomizations inde-
pendent across players, instead of the optimally correlated randomizations chosen by the mediator (see,
e.g. Aumann, 1974).
14The model by Banks and Calvert (1992) can be related to our construction. They also compare the
solution of self-enforcing mediation to what can be achieved without a mediator in an underlying two-
by-two game. But their underlying game is very dierent from our game of conict: They consider a
coordination game with incomplete information.
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high. Second, when the intensity of conict is low, but the uncertainty regarding the
disputants' strength is high.15
- How does the mediator help? When conict intensity is high, the mediator can
improve upon unmediated communication by oering unequal splits even when she
observes both players reporting to be doves. This is equivalent to an obfuscation
strategy by which the mediator does not reveal with probability one to a self-declared
dove that she is facing a dove. When the intensity is low but uncertainty is high,
the mediator's strategy involves proposing equal split settlements even when she
receives dierent messages. Equivalently, the mediator does not always reveal to a
self-declared hawk that she is facing a dove.
Although it is widely believed that a successful mediator should issue credible reports
to the conicting parties, we nd that such a reporting strategy would be sub-optimal.
Specically (and realistically), the mediator should not always reveal that a player is
weak, when this is the case.
- Does arbitration improve on mediation? Surprisingly, we nd that an arbitrator who
can enforce settlements is no more eective in preventing conict than a mediator
who can only propose self-enforcing agreements.16 Our results are in line with the
view that a mediator should not necessarily need enforcement power: \A mediated
settlement that arises as a consequence of the use of leverage may not last very
long because the agreement is based on compliance with the mediator and not on
internalization of the agreement-changed attitudes and perceptions" (Kelman, 1958).
15Interestingly, the intensity of conict and asymmetric information are considered among the most
important variables that aect when mediation is most successful (see e.g. Bercovitch and Houston, 2000,
and Bercovitch et al., 1991). Our ndings resonate with well-documented stylized facts in the empirical
literature on negotiation (Bercovich and Jackson 2001, Wall and Lynn, 1993), that show that parties are
less likely to reach an agreement without a mediator when the intensity of conict is high than when it is
low. Rauchhaus (2006) provides quantitative analysis showing that mediation is especially eective when
it targets asymmetric information.
16This result is in contrast with ndings in other environments (e.g., Cramton and Palfrey, 1995, Compte
and Jehiel, 2008, or Goltsman et al., 2009).
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We conclude the introduction by discussing a few papers that, like us, study mechanism
design in international conicts. The basic game of conict and arbitration model studied
in this paper are binary versions of the model by Bester and Warneryd (2006), who, unlike
us, do not solve the more involved mediation and unmediated communication problem. Fey
and Ramsay (2009) establish simple sucient conditions for mediation and communication
to achieve peace with probability one; unlike us, do not characterize optimal mechanisms
when they do not yield peace with probability one.17 Fey and Ramsay (2010) show that
mediation and unmediated communication yield the same outcomes in the special case when
all private information concerns only one's cost of ghting. Ours is the rst paper that
solves the optimal mediation and unmediated communication problem in a game of conict
where each player's private information includes features that bear direct implications on
the outcome of war, such as military strength, political resolve, or preference for ghting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our basic model of conict.
Section 3 studies unmediated communication. Section 4 solves optimal mediation. Section
5 compares mediation and arbitration. The nal section oers some concluding comments.
In particular, it discusses interim mechanism selection, mediator's commitment and con-
testants' renegotiation. All proofs are in appendices.
2 The Game of Conict
Two players contest a cake of size normalized to one.18 War shrinks the value of the
cake to  < 1. The expected payos in case of war depends on both players' private types.
Each player can be of type H or L with probability q and (1   q), respectively.19 This
17Another dierence is that unlike them we impose sequential rationality after every history, including
after deviations, as it aects incentives at the reporting stage (see for instance Green and Laont, 1987 for
the importance of applying sequential rationality after every history).
18Depending on the context, of course, the interpretation of the cake ranges from territory or exploitation
of natural resources to any measure of social surplus in a country or partnership.
19To simplify the analysis, and keep the problem's dimensionality in check, we adopt a fully symmetric
model. We believe that our results will hold approximately, for models that are close to symmetric.
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private characteristic can be thought of as related to resolve, military strength, leaders'
stubbornness, etc. We will often refer to type H as a \hawk" and to a L type as a \dove"
(with no reference to the hawk-dove game). When the two players are of the same type,
the expected share of the cake in case of war is 1=2 for both. When a type H player ghts
against an L type, her expected share of the cake is p > 1=2; and hence her expected
payo is p: If p < 1=2; the problem is trivial as conict can always be averted with the
anonymous split (1=2; 1=2); we shall therefore assume henceforth that p > 1=2:
We consider a simple \agreement" game where the two players simultaneously choose
whether to agree to a given cake division (x; 1  x) ; where x 2 [0; 1] is a parameter of
the game. Unless both players agree to the split, war takes place.20 We assume that
when the two players accept a peaceful split, this prevents war.21 For any value of the
split, we calculate the equilibria that maximize the ex ante chances of peace. Then, we
choose values of the split that maximize the peace chance, which will be denoted by V ,
the value. Our benchmark model is therefore directly comparable with the mediation and
unmediated communication programs that we will later describe in details. In fact, it can
be reformulated as a simple program where the split x 2 [0; 1] is chosen so as to maximize
peace chances, subject to ex-post individual rationality constraints only, without allowing
players the possibility to communicate.
The model has three parameters: ; p, and q. Yet, it turns out that a more parsimonious
20Even though simultaneous decisions to go to war are sequentially rational in all circumstances, one
could conceive other game forms with sequential decisions to accept or reject an agreement, and in such
game forms one could intuitively expect a lower frequency of war. Since this intuition about alternative
game forms can apply only for the game without communication and for unmediated communication, while
with mediation the order of play is irrelevant, it follows that our choice of game form, if anything, stacks
the deck against the mediator, hence making our conclusions to follow on the importance of mediation
robust to changes in the underlying game.
21If the cake is a resource that can be depleted in a short period and does not have spillovers on relative
strength, then there is no commitment problem. If the cake sharing is instead to be interpreted as a durable
agreement for example on the exploitation of a future stream of resources or gains from trade, then the
commitment problem is non trivial. In this case the agreement could be about periodic tributes to be made
in perpetuity, and there are ways to implement the agreement with sucient use of dynamic incentives.
See for example Schwartz and Sonin (2008).
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description of all results depend on only two statistics:22
  q
1  q and  
p   1=2
1=2  =2 :
The parameter  is the hawk/dove odds ratio, and   0 represents the ratio of benets
over cost of war for a hawk: the numerator is the gain for waging war against a dove instead
of accepting the equal split, and the denominator is the loss for waging war against a hawk
rather than accepting equal split. Given that  is increasing in , we will also interpret
situations with low  as situations of high intensity or cost of conict.
Armed with this simplication, we can now calculate the splits (x; 1  x) and equilibria
in the consequent war-declaration game that maximize the ex ante probability of peace.
First, note that for q=2+(1  q) p  1=2; or   ; both doves and hawks choose peace in
the peace-maximizing equilibrium of the game with x = 1=2: When  < ; the probability
of peace is maximized by setting x so that all doves play peace, together with the hawk
type of one of the two players. This is achieved by setting x  p; so as to convince the
hawk type of player 1 to play peace, against a player 2 who plays peace if and only if dove,
and 1   x  (1  q) =2 + q (1  p) ; so as to convince the dove type of player 2 to play
peace, against a player 1 who always plays peace. These two inequalities are both satised
for some x if and only if (1  q) =2+q (1  p) +p  1; i.e.,   1
2
( 1), which is always
satised when   1: When this condition fails, the probability of peace is maximized by
setting x = 1=2 so that doves play peace, and hawks declare war.
In sum, the optimal probability of peace absent communication or mediation is:
V =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  q)2 = 1
(+1)2
if  < 1
2
(   1);
1  q = 1
+1
if 1
2
(   1)   < ;
1 if   :
22This feature will allow us to give graphical illustrations of most results.
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3 Communication Without Mediation
Communication Game In order to study the value of unmediated communication,
we augment our basic model as follows. After privately learning her type, each player i
sends a message mi 2 fl; hg: The two messages are sent simultaneously. After observing
each other's message, the players play a specication of the agreement game, where the
split x may depend on the messages m = (m1;m2) and on the realization of a public
randomization device. Specically, we assume that with probability 1 p(m) a split x (m) is
selected that induces war as the unique equilibrium of the agreement game, e.g., x (m) = 0:
With probability p (m), the split x (m) is selected so as to induce peace in equilibrium. We
calculate the optimal values of the peaceful splits x() and the probabilities p() subject to
the constraints that players are willing to use the equilibrium communication and agreement
strategies.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we briey comment on the characteristics of our
communication protocol. Relative to the benchmark without communication, we have
introduced one round of binary cheap talk, and a public randomization device. Following
Aumann and Hart (2003), such a public randomization device can be replicated by an
additional round of communication (using so-called jointly controlled lotteries). Hence our
game can be reformulated as a two-round communication game without any extraneous
randomization device. For the sake of tractability, we do not consider the possibility of
further rounds of cheap talk.23 The restriction to binary messages is natural given the
binary type space. When focusing on pure-strategy equilibria, this restriction is without
loss of generality. But it is possible that more messages might help in mixed-strategy
equilibria (numerical optimization shows that allowing for three messages does not help).
On the other hand, the restriction to a single peaceful split x (m), for every m; rather than
the consideration of a lottery over peaceful splits, is without loss of generality.24
23This might help, however. Aumann and Hart (2003) provide examples of games in which longer, indeed
unbounded, communication protocols improve upon nite round communication.
24Note that can replace without loss any lottery over peaceful recommendations with its certainty equiv-
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Pure-strategy Equilibria. We momentarily ignore mixed strategies by the players
at the message stage. Those will be considered in the next subsection. Evidently, there is
always a pooling equilibrium in which both types choose the same reporting strategy, whose
outcomes coincide with the equilibrium of the agreement game without communication. We
now consider separating equilibrium, i.e., equilibrium in which each player truthfully reveals
her type.
Let us consider here only equilibria with peaceful splits x (m) and probabilities p (m)
that are symmetric across players. Such symmetry restriction entails that x(h; h) = x(l; l) =
1=2, and that we only need to nd another split value, i.e., b  x(h; l) = 1  x(l; h), given
that the message space contains only two elements. We shall later see that this restriction
is without loss of generality, because the separating equilibrium which minimizes the ex
ante probability of peace is calculated by solving a linear program.25 To shorten notation
further, we let pL  p(l; l); pH  p(h; h) and pM  p(h; l) = p(l; h).
Armed with these denitions, the optimal separating equilibrium is characterized by
the following program. Maximize the peace probability
min
b;pL;pM ;pH
(1  q)2(1  pL) + 2q(1  q)(1  pM) + q2(1  pH)
subject to the following ex post individual rationality (IR) constraints and ex interim incen-
tive compatibility constraints (ICL; IC

H).
26 First, reporting truthfully must be optimal.
alent. In fact, at the agreement stage, the requirement that the players accept such a deterministic average
split is less stringent than the requirement that they accept all splits in the support of the lottery. Fur-
ther, lotteries over peaceful splits aect each player's equilibrium payo at the communication stage only
through their expectations. Finally, the payo of a player who deviates at the communication stage is
convex in the recommended split, as we shall later see. Hence, the deviation payo is lower when replacing
a lottery with its certainty equivalent, thus making the equilibrium requirement less stringent.
25We will see that each player's constraints are linear in the maximization arguments. Thus, the con-
straint set is convex. Hence, suppose that an asymmetric mechanism maximizes the probability of peace.
Because the set-up is symmetric across players, the anti-symmetric mechanism, obtained by interchanging
the players' identities, is also optimal. But then, the constraint set being convex, it contains also the
symmetric mechanism obtained by mixing the above optimal mechanisms. As the objective function is
linear in the maximization argument, such symmetric mixed mechanism is also optimal.
26The \star" superscript refers to the fact that, when a player contemplates deviating at the message
stage, she also anticipates and takes into account that she might prefer to declare war ex post, even when
players are supposed to coordinate on peace. This explains the maxima on the right-hand side of the two
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For the dove. This constraint (ICL) states that
(1  q) ((1  pL)=2 + pL=2) + q ((1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)) 
(1  q) ((1  pM)=2 + pM maxfb; =2g) + q ((1  pH)(1  p) + pH maxf1=2; (1  p)g) :
The left-hand side is the dove's equilibrium payo. With probability 1   q; the opponent
is also a dove, in which case the equal split 1=2 occurs with probability pL and the payo
from war, =2; is collected with probability (1  pL) : With probability q; the opponent is
hawk. With probability pM ; this leads to the split 1   b; and with probability 1   pM to
the payo from war (1  p) : The right-hand side is the expected payo from exaggerating
strength. When the opponent is dove, the split b is recommended with probability pM : In
principle, the player may deviate from the recommendation, and collect the war payo =2;
hence the payo is max fb; =2g : Further, war takes place with probability 1  pM : When
the opponent is hawk, the split 1=2 is recommended with probability pH ; and war occurs
with probability 1  pH : Similarly, for the hawk, the constraint (ICH)
(1  q) ((1  pM)p + pMb) + q ((1  pH)=2 + pH=2) 
(1  q) ((1  pL)p + pLmaxf1=2; pg) + q ((1  pM)=2 + pM maxf1  b; =2g) ;
must hold, where the left-hand side is the equilibrium payo and the right-hand side is the
expected payo from \hiding strength."27
Second, players must nd it optimal to accept all peaceful splits. Given that, in a
constraints. As anticipated earlier, such maxima make the deviation payo convex in the recommended
peaceful split.
27Even though the constraints (ICL) and (IC

H) are not linear because of the maxima and of the products
pMb; they can be turned into linear constraints as follows. First, one replaces each constraint with four
constraints in which the left-hand sides equal the left-hand side of the original constraint with one of the
four pairs of the arguments of the two maxima, in lieu of the maxima. Second, one changes the variable b
with pB = pMb and the constraint 1=2  b  1 with pB  pM  2pB:
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separating equilibrium, messages reveal types, this requires that
b  p; 1  b  (1  p):
That is, a hawk facing a self-proclaimed dove must get a share b that makes war unprotable
against a dove. Similarly, the dove's share against a hawk cannot be so low that it is better
for her to go to war. The constraint that a player would accept an equal split when the
opponent's type is the same as her own, 1=2 > =2; is always satised.
Solving this program yields the following characterization. We here omit the precise
equilibrium formula, presented in the Appendix, as it is quite burdensome.
Proposition 1 There is a unique best separating equilibrium in the communication game
without mediation. This equilibrium displays the following characteristics, for  < :
 The ex ante probability of peace is strictly greater than in the absence of communica-
tion.
 Dove dyads do not ght: pL = 1:
 Hawk dyads ght with positive probability, pH < 1; and the dove's incentive compati-
bility constraint ICL binds.
 If   1 and/or   (1+) 1, then the hawk's incentive compatibility constraint ICH
does not bind, and b = p; further:
{ if  < =2; then hawk dyads ght with probability one, pH = 0; and asymmetric
dyads ght with positive probability, pM 2 (0; 1) ;
{ if   =2 (which covers also the case   (1+) 1); then hawk dyads ght with
positive probability, pH 2 (0; 1) ; and asymmetric dyads do not ght, pM = 0:
 If  < 1 and  < (1 + ) 1, then ICH binds and b > p; and further pH = 0 and
pM 2 (0; 1) for  < =(1 + ); whereas pH 2 (0; 1) and pM = 1 otherwise.
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We now elaborate on the characterization described above.
First, the separating equilibrium always improves upon the agreement game without
communication. While intuitive, this result is far from obvious: While at least one equilib-
rium of the communication game must be at least as good as the optimal agreement game
equilibrium, it is not an obvious implication that the separating equilibrium would strictly
improve upon all equilibria without communication.
Second, war is never optimal when both players report low strength: pL = 1; intuitively,
there is no need to punish self-reported doves by means of war, as they receive lower splits
on average than if reporting to be hawks.
Third, the truth-telling constraint for the low type, ICL, is always binding, because
on average hawks receive higher peaceful splits than doves. Given that the incentive to
exaggerate strength must be discouraged, there needs to be positive probability of war
following a high report. The most potent channel through which the low type's incentive
to exaggerate strength can be kept in check is by assigning a positive probability of war
whenever there are two self-proclaimed high types. When  is low (few high types) it is
indeed optimal to set pH = 0 and pM > 0, whereas for higher values of , pH < 1 and
pM = 1: When  is suciently high, the likelihood of a hawk is suciently high that
prescribing war against a dove is not needed to deter a dove to exaggerate strength. But
when  is low, deterring misreporting by a dove requires having self-reported hawks ght
both against hawks and doves, with positive probability.
Fourth, when the truth-telling constraint for the high type, ICH , is not binding, then
b = p; and when both truth-telling constraints are binding, then the ex post IR constraint
b  p does not bind. Hence, b is either pinned down by the ex post IR constraint b  p; or
by the joint ex interim truth-telling constraints. Intuitively, both (ICH) and the constraint
b  p need b suciently large to be satised. On the other hand, keeping in check the
(binding) constraint (ICL) requires keeping b as low as possible. Hence b will be such that
either ICH binds, or b = p:
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The other properties of the characterization of Proposition 1 are best described by
distinguishing the cases   1 and  < 1.
Suppose rst that   1, so that the benets from war are suciently high. Then
the ex post IR constraint always binds, and hence b = p; and the ex interim high-type
truth-telling ICH constraint never binds. This is because the hawk hiding strength always
prefers to wage war (both against hawks and doves). When b = p, the condition   1
is equivalent to 1   b  =2: As a result, the hawk obtains the payo p against doves,
regardless of her message, whereas against hawks she obtains =2 if hiding strength, and
either =2 (after a war recommendation) or 1=2 (after settlement) when truthfully reporting.
In sum, hawks receive a higher payo if revealing their type, and the ICH constraint never
binds.
Second, suppose that  < 1. For   1=(1 + ), the high-type truth-telling constraint
ICH binds, and b > p. To see why, suppose by contradiction that b = p: For  < 1;
this would imply that 1  b > =2: Consider a hawk pretending to be a dove. If she meets
a dove, she can secure the payo p by waging war. This is also the payo for revealing
being hawk and meeting a dove: She obtains p through war or through the split b = p: If
she meets a hawk, she gets 1  b with probability pM and =2 with probability 1  pM . By
claiming to be a hawk, she gets 1=2 with probability pH and =2 with probability 1  pH .
But we know that pM is larger than pH ; and because 1  b > =2; this gives an incentive to
pretend to be a dove (hiding strength) to secure peace more often than by revealing that
she is a hawk, which contradicts ICH . To make sure that both truth-telling constraints
are satised, we must have b > p, so as to reduce the payo from hiding strength. This
reduces both the payo from settling against a hawk when hiding strength and the payo
from settling against a dove when revealing to be hawk.
To see why b = p when  2 [1=(1 + ); ]; even if  < 1; note that pH increases in ,
as in the case of   1. Because the incentive to hide strength decreases as pH increases
relative to pM , we can reduce b as  increases. When  reaches the threshold 1=(1 + ),
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the oer b required for the high type truth-telling constraint to bind is exactly p. Further
increasing  cannot induce a further decrease in b, because the ex post IR constraint b  p
becomes binding. So in the region where  2 [1=(1 + ); ], the ICH constraint does not
bind and b = p.
We conclude this subsection by discussing the probability of peace in the best separating
equilibrium, pictured in Figure 1. For   1; it is U-shaped in  for   =2; and decreasing
in  when  is between =2 and . To understand the forces leading to the U-shaped eect
of  in the lower region, note rst that an increase in  shifts probability mass from the
LL dyad to the LH dyad and from the LH dyad to the HH dyad (the overall eect on
the likelihood of the LH dyad is that it increases in  if and only if  < 1): Because
1 = pL  pM > pH ; these shifts make the probability of peace initially decrease in :
However, pM strictly increases in  for   =2; and eventually this makes the probability
of peace increase in . Interestingly, despite the fact that pH strictly increases in , for
 > =2; it still does not grow fast enough to compensate for the shift in probability mass
towards the dyads with the higher probability of war. As a result, the probability of peace
decreases in  when  is between =2 and .
Figure 1: Probability of peace in the separating equilibrium
Mixed-strategy Equilibria. This subsection considers mixed strategy equilibria.
Mixing can help, though its role in the unmediated communication game is relatively lim-
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ited (compare Figure 1 and right panel of Figure 2). The following result states that, while
there is no mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the hawk randomizes between sending the
high and low report, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the dove random-
izes.28 Furthermore, in some parameter region, depicted in the right panel of Figure 2, such
a mixed strategy equilibrium yields a higher ex ante peace probability than the separating
equilibrium. The specic denition of the region in which mixing improves upon the sepa-
rating equilibrium is rather cumbersome, as is the explicit description of the mixed-strategy
equilibrium, and so it is relegated to the Appendix. But it is interesting to note that mixing
may improve only in a small subset of the parameter region in which both ex interim IC*
constraints bind: mixing by the dove may relax the incentive of the hawk to hide strength.
We summarize our ndings as follows.
Proposition 2 Allowing for mixed strategies in the unmediated communication game, the
best equilibrium is such that the hawk always sends message h and the dove sends l with
probability strictly less than one.
The probability  < 1 with which the dove sends l is reported in appendix, and shown
in the right panel of Figure 2.
Figure 2: Welfare in the best (pure or mixed) equilibrium, and region where mixing occurs
28In this subsection, and this subsection only, attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. That is,
we did not establish whether asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria may yield a higher welfare.
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4 Mediation
In the previous section, we have characterized the optimal equilibrium in the case in
which players send public messages. In this section, we consider mediated communication.
We modify the game form to account for such a mediator. In the rst stage, messages
are no longer public. They are separately reported to a mediator, who then proposes the
split, possibly at random. More precisely, the version of the revelation principle proved in
Myerson (1982) guarantees that the following game form entails no loss of generality:
- After being informed of her type, each player i privately sends a report mi 2 fl; hg
to the mediator.
- Given reports m = (m1;m2), the mediator recommends a split (b; 1   b) according
to some cumulative distribution function F (bjm); where the only recommendation
leading to war in the support of F (jm) is b = 0:29 Unlike the reports, the mediator's
recommendation is public.
- The contestants play the agreement game with the recommended split b:
Again by the revelation principle, we may restrict attention to distributions F such that
truthful type revelation and obedience to the mediator's recommendation are part of the
equilibrium. As before, this imposes both ex interim incentive compatibility constraints and
ex post individual rationality constraints, which we now describe. To simplify notation, we
restrict attention to mechanisms that are symmetric across players, where F (jm1;m2) =
1   F (jm2;m1) for all (m1;m2), and to discrete distributions F: We shall later see that
these restrictions entail no loss of generality.
Let Pr[m i; b;mi] denote the equilibrium joint probability that the players send mes-
sages (mi;m i) and that the mediator oers (b; 1   b), and set Pr[b;mi]  Pr[h; b;mi] +
29Clearly all recommendation leading to war induce the same payos, and hence can be subsumed by the
recommendation b = 0; which only induces war in the agreement game. This feature of the model should
not be taken literally. In the real world, mediators do not literally make recommendation leading to war,
but they may quit, and this usually results in conict escalation by the contestants.
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Pr[l; b;mi]. When player i is a hawk, she reports mi = h in equilibrium, and ex post
individual rationality requires that
bPr[b; h]  Pr[l; b; h]p + Pr[h; b; h]=2; for all b 2 (0; 1); (1)
which ensures that, if recommended the peaceful split b; i.e., for all b 2 (0; 1) such that
Pr[b; h] > 0; the hawk prefers accepting the split to starting a war. Similarly, when i is a
dove, ex post individual rationality dictates that
bPr[b; l]  Pr[h; b; l](1  p) + Pr[l; b; l]=2; for all b 2 (0; 1): (2)
Ex interim incentive compatibility requires that, when player i is a hawk, she truthfully
reports mi = h: The associated constraint (IC

H) dictates that
qF (0jhh)=2 + (1  q)F (0jhl)p +
Z 1
0
bdF (bjh)  qF (0jlh)=2 +
(1  q)F (0jll)p +
Z 1
0
maxfb;Pr[ljb; l]p + Pr[hjb; l]=2gdF (bjl); (3)
where Pr[m ijb;mi] = Pr[m i; b;mi]=Pr[b;mi] whenever Pr[b;mi] > 0, and F (jmi) 
qF (jmi; h) + (1   q)F (jmi; l); for mi and m i taking values l and h: Note that, as in
the optimal separating equilibrium program, player i might behave opportunistically after
deviating, as reected by the maxima on the right-hand side.
Similarly, to ensure truth-telling by player i when a dove, the following constraint (ICL)
must be satised:
qF (0jlh)(1  p) + (1  q)F (0jll)=2 +
Z 1
0
(1  b)dF (bjl)  qF (0jhh)(1  p) +
(1  q)F (0jlh)=2 +
Z 1
0
maxf1  b;Pr[ljb; h]=2 + Pr[hjb; h](1  p)gdF (bjh): (4)
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In the best equilibrium, the mediator seeks to minimize the probability of war, i.e.,
(1  q)2F (0jhh) + 2q(1  q)F (0jlh) + q2F (0jll):
Because recommendations need to be self-enforcing, there is a priori no reason to restrict
the mediator in the number of splits to which he assigns positive probability. In fact, rec-
ommendations convey information about the most likely opponents' revealed types, and it
might be in the mediator's best interest to scramble such information by means of multiple
recommendations. Nevertheless, Proposition 3 below shows that relatively simple mech-
anisms reach the maximal probability of peace among all possible mechanisms, including
asymmetric ones. These simple mechanisms can be described as follows. Given reports
(h; h), the mediator recommends the peaceful split (1=2; 1=2) with probability qH , and
war with probability 1   qH . Given reports (h; l), the mediator recommends the peaceful
split (1=2; 1=2) with probability qM , the split (b; 1  b) with probability pM , and war with
probability 1  pM   qM , for some b  1=2: Given reports (l; l), the mediator recommends
the peaceful split (1=2; 1=2) with probability qL, the splits (b; 1   b) and (1   b; b) with
probability pL each, and war with probability 1  2pL   qL.
Again, we relegate the explicit formulas of the solution to the Appendix, and restrict
ourselves here to the description of its main features.
Proposition 3 A solution to the mediator's problem is such that, for all  < :
 Doves do not ght: qL + 2pL = 1:
 The low-type incentive compatibility constraint ICL binds, whereas the high-type in-
centive compatibility constraint ICH does not, and b = p.
 For   1 and  > =2; hawk dyads ght with positive probability, qH 2 (0; 1), mixed
dyads do not ght (pM + 2qM = 1), and mediation strictly improves upon cheap talk.
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 For   1 and   =2, the solution exactly reproduces the separating equilibrium
of the cheap talk game (specically, qL = 1; qM = 0; pM 2 (0; 1) and qH = 0), and
mediation yields the same welfare as cheap talk.
 For  < 1; the probability pL of unequal splits among dove dyads is bounded above
zero, and mediation strictly improves upon cheap talk.
We now comment on the solution and we make some comparisons with the optimal
separating equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1.
Suppose that  > 1. If  > =2; then qM > 0: the mediator sometimes recommends
the equal split (1=2; 1=2) when one player reports to be a hawk, and the other claims to
be a dove. In this way, the ex post IR constraint of the high type who is recommended
the equal split becomes binding. We remark that this ex post constraint was slack in the
unmediated equilibrium. By making a slack constraint binding, the mediator increases the
probability of peace. Indeed, the mediator lowers the gain from pretending to be a hawk,
by making exaggerating strength less protable against doves. When   =2 instead,
qH = qM = 0 and the mediator does not improve upon unmediated communication. In this
case, in fact, in both the mediated and the best (unmediated) separating equilibrium, war
needs to occur with probability one in dyads of hawks, to avoid that doves misreport their
type. But then the above-mentioned slack constraint is not relevant for either program,
and the mediator cannot improve upon unmediated communication.
In contrast with the case of   1, the mediator always yields a strict welfare im-
provement when  < 1. When  > 1=(1 + ), so that b = p in the perfectly separating
equilibrium, it is also the case that  > =2 (note that 1= (1 + ) > =2), and hence the
mediator helps for the same reasons as when   1. When  < 1= (1 + ), the mediator
makes sure that the ICH constraint is satised with b = p. In fact, the mediator oers
(b; 1   b) with positive probability when both players report to be doves. A hawk who is
hiding strength, and who is oered 1  b believes that the opponent is most likely a hawk,
and does not wage war. This reduces the incentive to hide strength in order to wage war
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if revealed that the opponent is weak, that we observed in the unmediated equilibrium.
Hence, the expected payo of hiding strength is lower, and the ICH constraint is satised
with b = p. Note that the ex post individual rationality constraint b  p was slack in the
unmediated equilibrium. By making this rationality constraint binding, the mediator can
improve the objective function, i.e. increase the probability of peace.
We can now precisely answer the rst set of questions presented in the introduction:
 When does mediation improve on unmediated communication?
{ When the intensity and/or cost of conict is high (low ), mediation strictly
improves the peace chance with respect to unmediated cheap-talk.
{ When conict is not expected to be very costly or intense (high ), mediation
strictly improves the peace chance if and only if the proportion of hawks is
intermediate, i.e., for high expected power asymmetry.
 How does mediation improve on unmediated communication?
{ When the proportion of hawks is intermediate (high expected power asymmetry),
the mediator lowers the reward for a dove from mimicking a hawk, by not always
giving the lion's share to a declared hawk facing a dove (or, equivalently by not
always revealing to a self-reported hawk that she is facing a dove). This lowers
the incentive to exaggerate strength and achieves a favorable peace settlement
with a dove.
{ Instead, when the probability of facing a hawk is low and conict is expected
to be costly, the mediator's strategy is to oer with some probability unequal
split to two parties reporting low type (or, equivalently the mediator does not
always reveal to a dove that she is facing a dove). This lowers the incentive to
hide strength and seek peace with a hawk.
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Figure 3 shows the probability of peace in the mediated game compared to the proba-
bility of peace induced by the best separating equilibrium. We note one sharp dierence
between mediated and unmediated communication: the ex ante probability of peace is
decreasing in , for  2 [=2; ), without mediation, whereas in the same range the ex
ante probability of peace is increasing in  with mediation. This dierence could have an
important impact on an important debate in international relations, namely the debate on
\deterrence:" the higher is  (or q), the more \deterred" a country should be from initiating
a war, due to a higher likelihood of facing a hawk. Hence, a possible interpretation of this
dierence is that an international system with a level of deterrence higher than another is
\good" for peace if every bilateral crisis is dealt with using mediators, whereas it is \bad"
if direct communication is the most common way in which countries try to avoid wars.
Figure 3: Probability of peace in the mediated vs. unmediated case, and region where
mediation dominates
We conclude by briey discussing the comparison between mediation and the best com-
pletely mixed-strategy equilibrium. It should not be surprising to the reader familiar with
the literature on correlated equilibrium (see, e.g. Aumann, 1974) that mediation strictly
improves the chance of peace. By randomizing over recommendations, the mediator can
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reproduce any distribution induced by mixing. In unmediated communication, however,
because players must mix independently of each other, they cannot generate the optimal
correlated distribution chosen by the mediator. The mixing by the dove may improve
welfare upon the pure-strategy equilibrium, but at the cost of inducing war with positive
probability within dove dyads. This does not occur with a mediator, who induces war only
when at least one of the players is a hawk.
5 The Role of Enforcement
Even though the cause of war is asymmetric information, the analysis of the optimal
mediation problem involves a signicant enforcement problem. Countries are sovereign, and
enforcement of contracts or agreements is often impossible. Because war can be started
unilaterally, we have incorporated ex post IR and ex interim IC* constraints in the for-
mulation of the optimal mediation program. In our model, the residual ex ante chance
of war that results in the optimal mediation solution, can be thought as being due to a
combination of asymmetric information and enforcement problems.
So far, mediation has reduced to optimal information elicitation from, and transmission
to, the conicting parties. One might also wonder whether the mediator could further
reduce the ex ante probability of war if she were an arbitrator, i.e. if she were endowed
with the power of enforcing agreements. For this, it is enough to compare our ndings
with those of Bester and Warneryd (2006). Rather than imposing ex post IR constraints
and ex interim IC* constraints in our basic game of conict, they study the same set up
with ex interim IR and IC constraints. Conicting parties must be willing to participate
in the arbitration process, and to reveal their information to the arbitrator. But the
arbitrator's recommendations are enforceable by external actors, such as the international
community. Hence, they abstract away from enforcement, and their model is suitable to
describe arbitration.
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Formally, invoking the version of the revelation principle proved by Myerson (1979),
the Bester-Warneryd problem can be summarized as follows. The parties truthfully report
their types L;H to the arbitrator. The arbitrator recommends peaceful settlement with
probability p (m) after report m: Because recommendations are enforced by an external
agency, they can restrict attention to a single peaceful recommendation x (m) ; for each
report pair m:30 Symmetry is without loss of generality because the arbitrator's program
is linear, and entails that the settlement is (1=2; 1=2) if the players report the same type,
that the split is (b; 1  b) if the reports are (h; l), and (1  b; b) if they are (l; h), for some
b 2 [1=2; 1] : Let pL = p (l; l) ; pM = p (l; h) = p (h; l) and pH = p (h; h). The arbitrator
chooses b; pL; pM and pH so as to solve the program
min
b;pL;pM ;pH
(1  q)2 (1  pL) + 2q (1  q) (1  pM) + q2 (1  pH)
subject to ex interim individual rationality (for the hawk and dove, respectively)
(1  q) (pMb+ (1  pM) p) + q (pH=2 + (1  pH) =2)  (1  q) p + q=2;
(1  q) (pL=2 + (1  pL) =2) + q (pM (1  b) + (1  pM) (1  p) )  (1  q) =2 + q (1  p) ;
and to the ex interim incentive compatibility constraints (for the hawk and dove, respec-
tively)
(1  q) ((1  pM)p + pMb) + q ((1  pH)=2 + pH=2) 
(1  q) ((1  pL)p + pL=2) + q ((1  pM)=2 + pM(1  b)) ;
30In fact, both participation and revelation decisions are taken before knowing the arbitrator's recom-
mendation, and hence the players' payos depend only on the expected recommendation, and not on the
realized one. Hence, as in footnote 24, any lottery over peaceful recommendations can be replaced without
loss with its certainty equivalent.
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(1  q) ((1  pL)=2 + pL=2) + q ((1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)) 
(1  q) ((1  pM)=2 + pMb) + q ((1  pH)(1  p) + pH=2) :
In general, the solution of the program with an arbitrator (with enforcement power) pro-
vides an upper bound to the solution of the program with a mediator (without enforcement
power), as described in Section 4. Surprisingly, the solution of the latter program yields
the same welfare as the solution of the former program.31 Specically, for   =2; the
mechanisms with and without enforcement coincide. When  > =2; the simplest optimal
mechanism with enforcement is such that b < p, which is not self-enforcing. But the opti-
mal mechanism without enforcement obfuscates the players' reports, and this obfuscation
succeeds in fully circumventing the enforcement problem.
Proposition 4 An arbitrator who can enforce recommendation is exactly as eective in
promoting peace as a mediator who can only propose self-enforcing agreements.
The intuition is as follows. First, note that the dove's IC constraint and hawk's ex
interim IR constraint are the only ones binding in the solution of the mediator's program
with enforcement power. Conversely, the only binding constraints in the mediator's pro-
gram with self-enforcing recommendations are the dove's IC* constraint and the two ex
post hawk's IR constraints. Recall that, in our solution, the hawk is always indierent
between war and peace if recommended a settlement. Further, the dove's IC* constraint in
the mediator's problem with self-enforcing recommendations is identical to the dove's IC
constraint in the arbitrator's program, because a dove never wages war after exaggerating
strength in the solution of mediator's problem with self-enforcing recommendation.
Further, the hawk's ex interim IR constraint integrates the two binding hawk's ex
post IR constraints in the arbitrator's problem. While requiring a constraint to hold in
31This result facilitates the proof of Proposition 3. It is enough to establish that the simple mechanism
characterized there, and described in closed form in the Appendix, satises the more stringent constraints
of the mediator's program. Because this mechanism achieves the same welfare as the solution to the
arbitration problem, it must be optimal, a fortiori, in the mediator's program.
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expectation is generally a weaker requirement than having the two constraints, it turns out
that the induced welfare is the same. This is easiest to see when   =2, as in this case the
only settlement ever granted to a hawk is b; when the opponent is dove. For any mechanism
with this property, the ex interim IR and the ex post IR constraints trivially coincide. Let
us now consider the case  > =2: In this case, the optimal truthful arbitration mechanism
prescribes a settlement b < p that is not ex post IR for a hawk meeting a dove, as well as
prescribing a settlement with slack, equal to 1=2; to same type dyads. The mediator cannot
reproduce this mechanism. But it circumvents the problem with the obfuscation strategy
whereby the hawk is made exactly indierent between war and peace when recommended
either the split 1=2 or the split b = p. Hence, it optimally rebalances the ex post IR
constraints so as to achieve the same welfare as the arbitrator.
We can now answer the last question that we posed in the introduction.
 How do mediation and arbitration dier in terms of conict resolution?
{ In our game, there is no dierence in terms of optimal ex ante probability of
peace between the two institutions.
{ Either the two optimal mechanism coincide, for  low relative to ; or the medi-
ator's optimal obfuscation strategy circumvents her lack of enforcement power.
As striking as the results in this section might sound, we do not want to rule out the
possibility that they rely on our discrete type space assumption. It would be interesting to
examine when it extends to richer environments32
6 Concluding Remarks
By applying mechanism design techniques to the study of international conict reso-
lution, this paper derives a number of lessons on mediation, arbitration and unmediated
32Indeed, it is known since at least Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that such possibility results might
hinge on discreteness.
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communication. First, we have determined when mediation improves upon unmediated
communication. This is the case when the intensity of conict and/or cost of war is high
(low ); when power asymmetry has little impact on the probability of winning; and even
when neither  nor p is low, mediation can still be strictly better than direct communica-
tion when the ex ante chance of power asymmetry is high (intermediate q). Second, we
have characterized how mediation improves upon unmediated communication. In intuitive
terms, this is achieved by not reporting to a player with probability one that her opponent
is weak. In particular, when the ex ante chance of power asymmetry is high, the mediator
lowers the reward from mimicking a hawk by not always giving the lion's share to a hawk
facing a dove. When the expected intensity or cost of conict are high, regardless of the
expected degree of uncertainty, the mediator reduces the temptation to hide strength by a
strong player. The mediator's strategy is to lower the reward from mimicking a dove by
giving sometimes an unequal split to two parties reporting being a low type. Third, we
have shown that the value of deterrence may depend on the conict resolution institution.
For intermediate probability that the players are strong, the probability of peace increases
in the level of militarization when crises are mediated, whereas it decreases when peace
talk are unmediated. Finally, we have shown that an arbitrator who can enforce outcomes
is exactly as eective as a mediator who can only propose self-enforcing agreements.
We conclude the paper by discussing a few matters that arise from our analysis.
First, we address the question of whether disputants would consent to the involvement
of a mediator in the peace talks. Specically, suppose that we augment our mediation
game to include a stage in which, immediately after being informed of their types, the
contestants simultaneously and independently choose whether to accept the mediator or
resort to unmediated cheap talk. Further assume that mediation will take place if and
only if both players agree. It can be shown that this game admits both equilibria in which
mediation always takes place and ones in which it never occurs (details available upon
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request). Hence, the optimal equilibrium of this game is, again, the one with mediation.33
Second, we note that, while we have required recommendations to be self-enforcing, they
need not be renegotiation-proof, as they might be Pareto-dominated for the players. For
instance, when there is common belief that both players are hawks, they would be better o
settling for an equal split rather than going to war, although doing so is part of the solution.
Yet renegotiation-proofness does not seem to be a rst and foremost concern of real world
mediators. It is not overly realistic to think that, after the mediator quits, contestants
who struggled to nd an agreement in the presence of the mediator, will autonomously sit
down at the negotiation table again, in search for a Pareto improving agreement. Indeed,
while the literature on the causes of conict underlines that contestants may not be able
to individually commit to peaceful conict resolutions, it may well be the case that they
can jointly or even individually commit to belligerent resolutions, when such commitments
are ex ante valuable. Audience costs, for instance, are recognized to provide an important
channel that makes war threats credible (see, for instance, Tomz, 2007).
Finally, we revisit the issue of commitment by the mediator. Our analysis suggests
that the mediator's success relies on her commitment to quit in some circumstances, rather
than seeking a peaceful agreement in all contingencies. As stressed by Watkins (1998), this
may be achieved by means of so-called action-forcing events. Further, before starting the
mediation process, mediators often make clear to the disputants under which circumstances
they will quit. Such contingent plan of actions often include deadlines. According to Avi
Gil, one of the key architects of the Oslo peace process, \A deadline is a great but risky tool.
Great because without a deadline it's dicult to end negotiations. [The parties] tend to
play more and more, because they have time. Risky because if you do not meet the deadline,
either the process breaks down, or deadlines lose their meaning" (Watkins, 1998). Among
the many cases in which this technique was used, see for instance Curran and Sebenius
33Interestingly, scholars seem to disagree on the likely motives for consenting to mediation. According to
Princen (1992), such motives are individual interests, rather than \shared values". But Bercovitch (1992,
1997) argues that disputants might view mediation as an expression of their commitment to peaceful
conict resolution, and seek it out of a desire to improve their relationships with each other.
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(2003)'s account of how a deadline was employed by former Senator George Mitchell in the
Northern Ireland negotiations. Committing to such deadlines might be somewhat easier for
professional mediators whose reputation is at stake, but they have been also used both by
unocial and ocial individuals, including Pope John Paul II and former U.S. President
Jimmy Carter.34 Meanwhile, institutions like the United Nations increasingly sets time
limits to their involvement upfront (see, for instance, the U.N. General Assembly report,
2000).
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Appendix A - Unmediated Communication
Proof of Proposition 1 All the statements in the proposition, but the comparison with
no-communication, follow from the following characterization lemma:
Lemma 1 The best separating equilibrium is characterized as follows.
1. Suppose that   1.
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(a) When  < =(1 + ); both ex interim IC* constraints bind,
b > p; pH = 0; pM =
1
(1 + )(1  ) ; and V =
1 +  + (1  )
(1 + )(1  )(1 + )2 :
(b) When  2 [=(1 + );minf1=(1 + ); g]; both IC* constraints bind,
b > p; pM = 1; pH = 1  
(1 + )
; and V = 1  
(1 + )(1 + )2
:
(c) When  2 [1=(1 + ); ); only the ICL constraint binds,
b = p; pM = 1; pH =
2  
(2 + )
; and V =
2(1 + ) + 
2 +  + (2 + )
:
2. Suppose that  > 1.
(a) When  < =2; only the ICL constraint binds,
b = p; pH = 0; pM =
1
1 +    2; and V =
1 + 
(1 +    2)(1 + )2 :
(b) When  2 [=2; ), only the ICL constraint binds,
b = p; pM = 1; pH =
2  
( + 2)
; and V = 1  
(2 + )(1 + )
:
The proof of lemma 1 proceeds in two parts.
Part 1 (  1):
We set up the following relaxed problem:
min
b;pL;pM ;pH
(1  q)2(1  pL) + 2q(1  q)(1  pM) + q2(1  pH)
subject to the high-type ex post IR constraints:
b  p
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to the probability constraints:
pL  1; pM  1; 0  pH
and ex ante low-type IC* constraint:
(1  q)

(1  pL)
2
+ pL
1
2

+ q ((1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)) 
(1  q)

(1  pM)
2
+ pMb

+ q

(1  pH)(1  p) + pH 1
2

Step 1. We want to show that pL = 1: We rst note that setting pL = 1 maximizes the
LHS of the relaxed low-type IC* constraint and does not aect the RHS. It is immediate
to see that the high-type ex post constraint is not aected either.
Step 2. We want to show that the relaxed low-type IC* constraint binds. Suppose it does
not. It is possible to increase pH thus decreasing the objective function without violating
the constraint (note that there is no constraint that pH < 1 in the relaxed problem).
Step 3. We want to show that the high-type ex post constraint binds. Suppose it does
not. Then b > p; and it is possible to reduce b without violating the ex post constraint.
But this makes the low-type relaxed IC* constraint slack, because  b appears in the LHS
and b in the RHS. Because step 2 concluded that the low-type relaxed IC* constraint cannot
be slack in the solution, we have proved that the ex post constraint cannot be slack.
Step 4. We want to show that for   =2: pH = 0; pM = 11+ 2 in the relaxed
program. The low-type relaxed IC* constraint and ex post constraint dene the function
pM =
(1  pH( + 2))
(   2+ 1) ; (5)
substituting this function into the objective function
W = 2(1  q)(1  pM) + q(1  pH)
duly simplied in light of step 1, we obtain the following expression:
W = pH
(2+  + 3)
(   2+ 1) (+ 1) +
2   3+    22
(   2+ 1) (+ 1) ;
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where we note that, because   2; the coecient of pH is positive and the whole expres-
sion is positive. Hence, minimization of W requires minimization pH : Setting pH = 0 and
solving for pM in (5) yields
pM =
1
1 +    2:
Because   =2; it follows that pM  1, as required. We note that the probability of war
equals:
C =
(2   3+    22)
(   2+ 1) (+ 1)2 :
Step 5. We want to show that for   =2, pM = 1; pH = 2 (+2) in the relaxed problem.
In light of the previous step, the solution pH = 0 yields pM > 1 and is not admissible when
 > =2. Because pM decrease in pH in (5), the solution requires setting pM = 1 and, from
(5), pH =
2 
(+2)
. When   =2; pH  0 and hence the solution is admissible. We note
that the probability of war equals:
C =

( + 2) (+ 1)
:
Step 6. We want to show that the solution constructed satises all the program con-
straints. The low-type ex post constraint 1  b  (1 p) is trivially satised, when b = p.
Because b > =2 and 1=2 > (1   p), the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with
the low-type ex ante relaxed IC* constraint. The condition 1   b = 1   p  =2 yields
2   2p  , i.e. 1     2p   1, i.e.  = 2p 1
1   1. Hence, for   1, we conclude that
1  b  =2. So, after simplication, the ex ante high-type IC* constraint becomes:
(1  q) p + q

(1  pH)
2
+ pH
1
2

= (1  q) ((1  pM)p + pMb) + q

(1  pH)
2
+ pH
1
2


(1  q) ((1  pL)p + pLp) + q

(1  pM)
2
+ pM

2

= (1  q) p + q=2;
which is satised (with slack when   =2). The probability constraints are obviously
satised.
Part 2 ( < 1). We allow for two cases:
37
Case 1. I will temporarily consider the following relaxed problem:
min
b;pL;pM ;pH
(1  q)2(1  pL) + 2q(1  q)(1  pM) + q2(1  pH)
subject to the low-type and high-type relaxed IC* constraints:
(1  q)

(1  pL)
2
+ pL
1
2

+ q ((1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)) 
(1  q)

(1  pM)
2
+ pMb

+ q

(1  pH)(1  p) + pH 1
2

(1  q) ((1  pM)p + pMb) + q

(1  pH)
2
+ pH
1
2


(1  q)p + q

(1  pM)
2
+ pM(1  b)

:
which embed the assumption (to be veried ex post) that 1 b  =2; and to the probability
constraints:
pL  1; pM  1; 0  pH
Step 1. As in the previous case, we conclude that pL = 1.
Step 2. We want to show that the low-type relaxed IC* constraint binds. Indeed, if it
does not, we can increase pH without violating neither relaxed IC* constraints (note that
the LHS of the high-type relaxed IC* constraint increases in pH).
Step 3. We want to show that the high-type relaxed IC* constraint binds. Suppose not.
We can then reduce b because the LHS of the high-type relaxed IC* constraint increases
in b and the RHS decreases in b. This makes the low-type relaxed IC* constraint slack,
without changing pM and pH . But in light of step 2, this cannot minimize the objective
function. Hence, the high-type relaxed IC* constraint must bind.
Step 4. We want to show that for  < =(1 + ), pH = 0 and pM =
1
(1+)(1 ) solve
the relaxed problem. The binding relaxed ex ante IC* constraints dene the function:
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[pM ; b] (pH), after substituting  for q and  for p, we obtain:
b =
2+         2pH + pH   3pH + 2pH   2pH   2pH   2pH + 2pH + 1
2 (1  pH   pH) (+ 1)
pM =
(1  pH(1 + ))
( + 1) (1  ) : (6)
Substituting pM into the objective function
W = 2(1  q)(1  pM) + q(1  pH)
duly simplied in light of step 1, we obtain:
W = pH

1   +
2        2   2
( + 1) (+ 1) (1  ) ;
because the coecient of pH is positive, this quantity is minimized by setting pH = 0.
Then, solving for pM and b when pH = 0 we obtain:
b =   1
2+ 2
( 2   + +    1)
pM =
1
( + 1) (1  )
we know that 1    ; so pM  0; but the condition pM  1 yields 1(+1)(1 )   1  0;
i.e.   
+1
; as stated. We note that the probability of war equals:
C =
(  2 +  + 2 + 2)
( + 1) (+ 1) (  1) :
Step 5. We want to show that for  < =(1 + ), pH = 0 and pM =
1
(1+)(1 ) solve the
original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the relaxed
low-type ex ante IC* constraint. We need to show that the ex post constraint b  p is
satised. In fact, simplication yields:
b  p = 1
2
(+ 1) 1 (1  ) (1  ) > 0:
39
Finally we show that the high-type IC* constraint coincides with the (binding) relaxed
high-type IC* constraint, i.e. that 1   b  =2. Note in fact, that this implies that the
ex post constraint 1   b  (1  p)  is satised, because =2 > (1  p) . Indeed, after
simplication, we obtain:
1  b  =2 = 1
2
(+ 1) 1 (1  ) (1  )  0:
Step 6. We want to show that for  2 [=(1 + );minf1=(1 + ); g]; pM = 1; pH =
1   
(1+)
solves the relaxed problem. When  > =(1 + ), setting pH = 0 violates the
constraint pM = 1: Further, the expression (6) reveals that pM decreases in pH . Hence
minimization of pH ; which induces minimization of W , requires setting pM = 1: Solving for
b and pH , we obtain:
b =  (   3 + 2      
2 + 2   1)
2+ 2 + 2 + 2
pH =
   + 
( + 1)
= 1  
(1 + )
:
The condition that pH  0 requires that   +1 as stated.
Step 7. We want to show that for  2 [=(1 + );minf1=(1 + ); g]; pM = 1; pH =
1  
(1+)
solves the original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides
with the relaxed low-type ex ante IC* constraint. We need to show that the ex post
constraint b  p is satised. In fact, simplication yields:
b  p = 1
2
( + 1) 1 (+ 1) 1 (+    1) (   1) 
and this quantity is positive if and only if   1
+1
: Finally we show that the high-type ex
ante IC* constraint coincides with the (binding) relaxed high-type ex ante IC* constraint,
i.e. that 1   b  =2. Note in fact, that this implies that the ex post constraint 1   b 
(1  p)  is satised, because =2 > (1  p) . Indeed, after simplication, we obtain:
1  b  =2 = 1
2
( + 1) 1 (+ 1) 1 (1  )     +    2 + 1
and  + 2+1  0 if and only if   1
+1
( + 2   1) but because 1
+1
( + 2   1) <

+1
, this condition is less stringent than   
+1
.
40
Case 2. We want to show that for  2 [1=(1 + ); ); pM = 1; pH = 2 (2+) solve the
original problem. Consider now the same relaxed problem that we considered in the proof
for the case of   1. We know from the analysis for the case   1, that this relaxed
problem is solved by pH = 0; pM =
1
1+ 2 ; b = p for  < =2 and by pM = 1; pH =
2 
(+2)
; b = p for  2 [=2; ). We now note that
1
 + 1
  =2 = 1
2
( + 1) 1 (1  ) ( + 2)
and this quantity is positive when   1. Hence the possibility that  < =2 is ruled
out: On the domain 1=(1 + )      1, the solution to the relaxed problem is
pM = 1; pH =
2 
(+2)
, with b = p. We now need to show that this is also the solution
of the original problem. Again, the low-type ex ante IC* constraint coincides with the
relaxed low-type ex ante IC* constraint. Consider the ex ante high-type IC* constraint.
The condition 1   b = 1   p  =2 yields  = 2p 1
1   1. Hence, for   1, we conclude
that 1  b  =2, and hence that 1  b  (1  p) . So the ex ante high-type IC* constraint
becomes:
(1 q) ((1  pM)p + pMp)+q

(1  pH)
2
+ pH
1
2

 (1 q)p q

(1  pM)
2
+ pM(1  p)

 0
and indeed, after simplication, the LHS equals:
1
2
( + 2) 1 (+ 1) 1 (+    1) (1  ) ;
a positive quantity as long as + 1, i.e.,  > 1
+1
, which is exactly the condition under
which we operate.
This concludes the proof of the characterization lemma.
One can then verify by inspection that the above full characterization determines all the
characteristics highlighted in Proposition 1, but the comparison with no communication,
which we now determine.
For  > 1;  < =2 and  <  1
2
; the separating equilibrium optimal value 1+
(1+ 2)(1+)2
is evidently larger than the optimal no-communication value 1
(1+)2
:
Suppose that  > 1;  < =2; and  >  1
2
: The separating equilibrium optimal value
and the no-communication values are, respectively, 1+
(1+ 2)(1+)2 and
1
+1
: The dierence
is:
1 + 
(1 +    2)(1 + )2  
1
+ 1
=
(2+ 1  )
(   2+ 1) (+ 1)2 ;
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and this quantity is positive because  >  1
2
and  < =2:
Suppose that  > 1 and  > =2; and  >  1
2
: The separating equilibrium optimal
value is 1  
(2+)(1+)
: Taking the dierence with the no-communication value,
1  
(2 + )(1 + )
  1
+ 1
= 2

( + 2) (+ 1)
> 0:
Suppose that  < 1 and  < =(1 + ): The separating equilibrium optimal value is
1++(1 )
(1+)(1 )(1+)2 : Hence,
1 +  + (1  )
(1 + )(1  )(1 + )2  
1
+ 1
=
(   +  + 1)
( + 1) (+ 1)2 (1  ) ;
because  <  < 1; the above is positive if    +  + 1 > 0; i.e.  >  1
+1
which always
holds.
Suppose that  < 1 and  < =(1 + ): The separating equilibrium optimal value is
1  
(1+)(1+)2
: Hence,
1  
(1 + )(1 + )2
  1
+ 1
=
(+  + 1)
( + 1) (+ 1)2
> 0
Suppose that  < 1 and  2 [1=(1+); ); so that the separating equilibrium optimal value
is 2(1+)+
2++(2+)
and
2(1 + ) + 
2 +  + (2 + )
  1
+ 1
= 2 ( + 2) 1 (+ 1) 1  > 0:
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The Proposition follows from this Lemma.
Lemma 2 Allowing players to play mixed strategies in the unmediated communication
game, the optimal equilibrium is such that the hawk always sends message h and the dove
sends message l with probability , where  < 1 if and only if  < 1 and

1 + 
>  > max
(
 1   (5 + 6) +p(1 + 3) (1 +  (11 + 8 (3 + 2)))
2 (1 + ) (1 + 3)
;
 1   (8 + 3) +p1 +  (16 +  (54 +  (48 + 25)))
2 (2   1)
)
:
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For  < 22= (1 + 3) ;
pM =
2   + 
2(1 + )(   ) ; pH = 0;  = 1 +

2
(1  1=); b = (1 + (1  ))=2
and V =
(2(4 + 3)    2(3 + 2))
4(   )(1 + )2 :
For  > 22= (1 + 3) ;
pM = 1; pH = 0; b = p;  =
(1 + )(1 + )
(1 + 2)
; and V =
2
(1 + 2)2
:
We omit the proof of Lemma 2 as it is very involved, and the Lemma is only a secondary
result in the paper. The proof is available upon request.
Appendix B { Mediation
For reasons of clarity, the proof of Proposition 3 is postponed to after the proof of
Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows from this Lemma.
Lemma 3 The solution of the mediator's program with enforcement power is such that:
For   =2,
pM =
1
   2+ 1 ; pH = 0; and V =
( + 1)
(   2+ 1) (+ 1)2 ;
For   =2;
pM = 1; pH =
2  
(   + 1); and V =
 + 1
(   + 1) (+ 1) :
Proof. We rst solve the following relaxed program:
min
b;pL;pM ;pH
(1  q)2 (1  pL) + 2q (1  q) (1  pM) + q2 (1  pH)
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subject to high-type ex interim individual rationality:
(1  q) (pMb+ (1  pM) p) + q

pH
1
2
+ (1  pH) 
2

 (1  q) p + q 
2
;
to low-type ex interim incentive compatibility:
(1  q)

(1  pL)
2
+ pL
1
2

+ q ((1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)) 
(1  q)

(1  pM)
2
+ pMb

+ q

(1  pH)(1  p) + pH 1
2

;
and to
pL  1; pM  1 and pH  0:
First, note that pL = 1 in the solution because pL appears in the constraints only in
the right-hand side of the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility constraint, which is
increasing in pL. Second, note that the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility must
be binding in the relaxed program's solution, or else one could increase pH thus reducing
the value of the objective function, without violating the high-typeex interim individual
rationality constraint. Third, note that the high-type ex interim individual rationality
constraint must be binding in the relaxed program's solution, or else one could decrease b
and make the low-type ex interim incentive compatibility slack.
Solving for b and pH as a function of pM in the system dened by the low-type ex
interim incentive compatibility and high-type ex interim individual rationality constraints,
and plugging back the resulting expressions in the objective function, we obtain
C =  pM  + 1
(+ 1) ( + 1  ) +K;
where K is an inconsequential constant. Hence, the probability of conict is minimized by
setting pM = 1 whenever possible. Substituting pM = 1; in the expression for pH earlier
derived, we obtain pH =
2 
( +1) , which is strictly positive for   =2 and always smaller
than one.
Solving for b and pM as a function of pH in the system dened by the low-type ex
interim incentive compatibility and high-type ex interim individual rationality constraints,
and plugging back the resulting expressions in the objective function, we obtain
C =
( + 1)
(   2+ 1) (+ 1)pH +K;
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where K is another inconsequential constant. The coecient of pH is positive for   =2;
hence the probability of conict is minimized by setting pH = 0, which entails pM =
1
 2+1 ;
a quantity positive and smaller than one when   =2:
The proof of Lemma 3 and hence of Proposition 4 is concluded by showing that this
solution does not violate the high-type ex interim incentive compatibility and low-type ex
interim individual rationality constraints in the complete program.
Indeed, for   =2, we verify that the slacks of these constraints are, respectively
1
2
(   + 1) 1 (1  ) (   ) ( + 1) > 0;
and
1
2
(   + 1) 1 ( + 1) (1  ) > 0:
Similarly, for   =2; the slacks are
1
2
(   2+ 1) 1 (+ 1) 1 (1  ) (   ) ( + 1) > 0;
and
1
2
( + 1  2) 1 (+ 1) 1 ( + 1) (1  ) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. The characterization follows from this Lemma.
Lemma 4 A solution to the mediator's problem is such that:
 For   =2,
qL + 2pL = 1; qH = qM = 0; b = p; pM =
1
1 +    2:
Further,
pL  2
(   2+ 1) (   1) ; if   1; pL 
(1  )
22
(  ) ( + 2)
(     1) if  < 1;
The ex ante peace probability is
V =
 + 1
(1 +    2)(1 + )2 :
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 For   =2,
qL + 2pL = 1; pM + qM = 1; b = p; qH =
2  
( + 1  ) ; qM =
2  
( + 1  ) ;
and qL  (2 )2( +1) : Further, for   1;
pL  2 (   ) ( + 2)
(   + 1)  (   1) if   1; pL 
(1  )
22
(  ) ( + 2)
(     1) if  < 1;
The ex ante peace probability is
V =
 + 1
(   + 1) (+ 1) :
Proof. Consider the general mechanisms subject to the ex post IR and ex interim IC*
constraints (1)-(4). It is straightforward to observe that the ex post IR constraints con-
straints are stronger than the following (high-type and low-type, respectively) ex interim
IR constraints
Z 1
0
bdF (bjh)  Pr[l; h]p + Pr[h; h]=2;Z 1
0
bdF (bjl)  Pr[h; l](1  p) + Pr[l; l]=2; for all b 2 [0; 1]
and that the ex interim IC* constraint are stronger than the ex interim IC constraint
obtained by substituting the maxima with their rst argument (the interim payo induced
by accepting peace recommendations later in the game).
By the revelation principle by Myerson (1979), the optimal ex ante probability of peace
within the class of mechanisms which satisfy these ex interim IC and IR constraints cannot
be larger than the ex ante probability of peace identied in Lemma 3 in Appendix D.
Because the ex interim IC and IR constraints are weaker than the ex interim IC* and ex
post IR constraints, it follows that any mechanism subject to the constraints (1){(4) cannot
yield a higher ex ante probability of peace than the one identied in Lemma 3.
Hence, to prove the result, it is enough to show that the formulas for the choice
variables (b; pL; qL; pM ; qM ; qH) satisfy the constraints (1)-(4) and achieve the same ex
ante probability of peace as in Lemma 3. Specialize to the mechanisms described by
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(b; pL; qL; pM ; qM ; qH), the ex post IR constraints take the following form, for the high type:
bpM  pMp; (qqH + (1  q)qM)  1=2  qqH=2 + (1  q)qMp;
and for the low type:
pLb  pL=2; (qpM + (1  q)pL)(1  b)  qpM(1  p) + (1  q)pL=2;
(qqM + (1  q)qL)  1=2  qqM(1  p) + (1  q)qL=2;
whereas the high-type ex interim IC* constraint is
q(qH=2 + (1  qH)=2) + (1  q)(pMb+ qM=2 + (1  pM   qM)p) 
maxf(qpM + (1  q)pL)(1  b); qpM=2 + (1  q)pLpg+maxf(1  q)pLb; (1  q)pLpg
+maxf(qqM + (1  q)qL)  1=2; qqM=2 + (1  q)qLpg
+q(1  pM   qM)=2 + (1  q)(1  2pL   qL)p;
and the low-type ex interim IC* constraint is
q(pM(1  b) + qM=2 + (1  pM   qM)(1  p))
+(1  q)(pLb+ pL(1  b) + qL=2 + (1  2pL   qL)
2
) 
maxf(1  q)pMb; (1  q)pM 
2
g+maxf(qqH + (1  q)qM)  1=2; qqH(1  p) + (1  q)qM 
2
g
+q(1  qH)(1  p) + q(1  pM   qM)=2;
It is straightforward to verify that the values provided in Lemma 4 are such that the ex
ante IC* constraint in which the low type does not wage war after misreporting is binding.
Also, plugging in our two sets of values for the choice variables gives the same welfare as
in Proposition 3. We are left with showing that all other constraints are satised. We
distinguish the two cases.
Step 1. Suppose that  < =2, so that qM = qH = 0: After simplication, the low-type
IC* constraint becomes
q(pM(1  p) + (1  pM)(1  p)) + (1  q)  1=2 
(1  q)pMp + q(1  p) + q(1  pM)=2;
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which is binding for pM =
1
1+ 2 : Consider the high-type IC* constraint
q=2 + (1  q)(pMb+ (1  pM)p)  maxf(qpM + (1  q)pL)(1  b); qpM=2 + (1  q)pLpg
+maxf(1  q)pLb; (1  q)pLpg+maxf(1  q)qL  1=2; (1  q)qLpg+ q(1  pM)=2;
Note that
(qpM + (1  q)pL) (1  b)  qpM=2 + (1  q)pLp;
as long as either  > 1 or pL  (1 )2 pM = (1 )22 ( )(+2)(  1) for  < 1; that
(1  q) pLb = (1  q) pLp
and that
(1  q)qL  1=2  (1  q)qLp:
Then we substitute in the high-type IC* constraint (duly simplied):
q=2 + (1  q)(pMb+ (1  pM)p)  q=2 + (1  q) p;
which is clearly satised because b = p.
Similarly, we nd that the two high-type ex post constraints
pMb  pMp; and (qqH + (1  q)qM)  1=2  qqH=2 + (1  q)qMp
are satised | the second one because both sides equal zero.
We need to show that the low-type ex post constraints are satised. Indeed:
pLp > pL=2; (1  q)qL  1=2 > (1  q)qL=2;
whereas
(qpM + (1  q)pL) (1  p)  qpM(1  p) + (1  q)pL=2;
as long as pL (   1) = pL (+2p 2)(1 )  2 q(1 q)pM = 2pM : So that if   1; pL  2( 2+1)( 1)
and if  < 1; pL  0  2( 2+1)( 1) :
Finally the probability constraints are satised. In fact, 0  pM  1 requires only that
1  1 +    2; i.e., that   =2:
Step 2. Suppose that   =2. Consider the low-type constraint, rst. After simplifying
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maxima, as the low type always accepts the split if exaggerating strength, the low-type IC*
constraint is satised as an equality when plugging in the expressions pM + qM = 1; b = p;
qH =
2 
(+1 ) ; qM =
2 
(+1 ) :
Then we consider the high-type IC* constraint. We proceed in two steps. We rst
determine the o-path behavior of the high type and show that
(qpM + (1  q)pL)  (1  b)  qpM=2 + (1  q)pLp
as long as either  > 1 or pL  (1 )2 p+M = (1 )22 ( )(+2)(  1) for  < 1; that
(1  q)pLb = (1  q)pLp and that (qqM + (1  q)qL) 1=2  qqM=2 + (1  q)qLp
as long as qL  1 2p 1 q1 qqM ; i.e. qL   qM = (2 )2( +1) :
Then we verify that the consequentially simplied high-type IC* constraint is satised
with equality, when substituting in the expressions pM + qM = 1; b = p; qH =
2 
(+1 ) ;
qM =
2 
(+1 ) :
We then verify that the two high-type ex post constraints
pMb  pMp; and (qqH + (1  q)qM)  1=2  qqH=2 + (1  q)qMp
are satised with equality when substituting in the expressions for b = p; qH =
2 
(+1 ) ;
qM =
2 
(+1 ) :
Finally, show that the low-type ex post constraints are satised. In fact
pLp > pL=2; and (qqM + (1  q)qL)  1=2 > qqM(1  p) + (1  q)qL=2;
(qpM + (1  q)pL) (1  p)  qpM(1  p) + (1  q)pL=2;
as long as pL (   1) = pL (+2p 2)(1 )  2 q(1 q)pM = 2pM . So that if   1; pL 
2 ( )(+2)
( +1)( 1) and if  < 1; pL  0  2 ( )(+2)( +1)( 1) :
Finally the probability constraints are satised. In fact, because  + 1    > 0; 2  
   ( + 1  ) = (+ 1) (  ) < 0; and 2     ( + 1  ) = ( + 2) (  ) ; the
conditions 0  qH  1 and 0  qM  1 require only that 2    0:
Having proved that the claimed solution satises all constraints, the proof of Lemma 4,
and hence Proposition 3 is now concluded.
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Mediation and Peace
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MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Proof of Lemma 2. We proceed in three parts.
Part 1. (The low type mixes).
The choice variables are b, , pL, pM , and pH . We have 19 constraints, i.e. one IC for
the low type which is binding, four IC for the high type to get rid of the maximum in the
constraint, two ex post constraints for high type, four ex post constraints for low type, and
eight probability constraints. First we rearrange the IC constraint for low type and express
b in terms of the other variables. Substituting b into objective function and constraints,
we get rid of b and IC constraint for low type. After simplifying the constraints, we are
left with the following constraints, referred to as constraints Ci, i = 1; : : : ; 9. (We omit the
constraints that all probabilities must be in [0; 1].)
1. ICH1 : (1 + )pM(1 +   2)  (1 + )pH(1 +   ) + pL;
2. ICH2 :  pH + pM + (pH+pL 2pM )1+ ;
3. ICH3 : (1 + )(  + )pH + ( 1 +    2)(pH   pM) + (pH + pL   2pM)2;
4. ICH4 : (1+)( +)pH +(( 1+   2)pH + (pL+pL  pM)+ pM +2pM)+
(pH + pL   2pM)2;
5. EXH1 : pM + pL + pH( 1  (2 + )+ )  pM(   2+ 2);
6. EXH2 : + ( 1 + );
7. EXL1 : pH(1+ )(1+(2+) )+(pM(2+(3+) 2)+pL( 1 +));
8. EXL3 : pM(2 + (3 + )  2) + pL + pH( 1  (2 + )+ );
9. EXL4 : 1  (1+) 1 + :
 case 1: C5 binds
This section covers the case that only C5 binds. We do not assume C5 binds ex ante.
1
We set up the following relaxed problem:
min
pL;pM ;pH ;
1  (( 
1 + 
)2pL + 2

1 + 
1 +   
1 + 
pM + (
1 +   
1 + 
)2pH)
subject to the following constraints:
1. pL  1,
2. 0  pM  1,
3. pH  0,
4. 0    1,
5. C5  0 , pL  (1 + (2 + )  )pH + (   2+ 2   1)pM .
{ Case 1.1: Parameter Region is 1=2<  1
2
( 1 + p5) and 1 

<  < 2, or
 > 1
2
( 1 +p5) and  <  < 2.
1. We want to show that pL = 1. Suppose pL < 1. We can set pL = 1 and
increase pH to make sure C5 is satised. By doing so, no constraint will be
violated and the objective function is strictly decreased.
2. We want to show that C5 binds. Suppose it does not. We can increase pH
without violating other constraints and decrease the objective function.
3. Suppose ( 2+2 1) > 0. Then MCpM
MCpH
= 2+( 2 1)
1+ +(1+) <
2
1+  =
MUpM
MUpH
,
since (   2   1) < 0 and (1 + ) > 0. Therefore, we want pM to be as
large as possible and pH to be as small as possible, i.e. pM = 1 or pH = 0.
If      2+ 2   1, pH = 0 and pM =  2+2 1 .
If      2+ 2   1, pM = 1 and pH = 1 +2 1 +2+ .
4. Suppose (   2 + 2   1)  0. We have pL + (  + 2   2 + 1)pM 
(1 + (2 + )  )pH . Then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH = 1 +2 1 +2+ .
5. To sum up, we conclude that:
(a) If 0    1 + 2   , then pL = 1, pM = 1, pH = 1 +2 1 +2+ , and
V = (1+ )
2
(1+)(1+(2+) ) .
(b) If 1    1 + 2   , then pL = 1, pH = 0, pM =  2+2 1 , and
V =   (1+ )(( 1+ 2)(1+)+(1+))
(1+)2(1 +2 2) .
Under the parameter region we specify above, we know that 1+2   1.
Since   1, only case (a) is possible. And V is minimized when  = 1.
6. The solution to the relaxed problem is pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
2 
2+
,  = 1,
and V = 
2++2+
. Substituting these into the original problem, we can
show that all the constraints are satised. Therefore, this is also the solution
to the original problem.
2
{ Case 1.2: Parameter Region is 0<  1
2
and  > 1, or  > 1
2
and  > 2.
1. We want to show that pL = 1. Suppose not. We can increase pL and pH
and decrease the objective function without violating the other constraints.
2. It is easy to show that C5 binds. Suppose not. We can increase pH and
decrease the objective function without violating the other constraints.
3. Suppose (   2+ 2   1) > 0.
If MCpM
MCpH
= 2+( 2 1)
1+ +(1+)  21+  = MUpMMUpH , then we want pM to be as large
as possible and pH to be as small as possible, i.e. pM = 1 or pH = 0. If
     2+ 2   1, pH = 0 and pM =  2+2 1 . If      2+ 2   1,
pM = 1 and pH =
1 +2 
1 +2+ .
If MCpM
MCpH
= 2+( 2 1)
1+ +(1+) >
2
1+  =
MUpM
MUpH
, we want pM to be as small as
possible and pH to be as large as possible, i.e. pM = 0 and pH =

1+(2+)  .
4. Suppose (   2 + 2   1)  0. We have pL + (  + 2   2 + 1)pM 
(1 + (2 + )  )pH . Then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH = 1 +2 1 +2+ .
5. To sum up, we conclude that:
(a) If 0    1+2 
2
, we have pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
1 +2 
1 +2+ , and
V = (1+ )
2
(1+)(1+(2+) ) .
(b) If ( 1+ 2)(1+) 1++2 >   1+2 2 , pL = 1, pM = 0, pH = 1+(2+)  .
And V = (1+ )(1 +(3+2+(1++)))
(1+)2(1+(2+) ) .
(c) If max(1+2 
2
; ( 1+ 2)(1+) 1++2 )    1 + 2   , then pL = 1, pM = 1,
pH =
1 +2 
1 +2+ , and V =
(1+ )2
(1+)(1+(2+) ) .
(d) If max(1 + 2   ; ( 1+ 2)(1+) 1++2 )    1, pL = 1, pH = 0, pM =

 2+2 1 , and V =   (1+ )(( 1+ 2)(1+)+(1+))(1+)2(1 +2 2) .
6. Under the parameter region we specify above, all the cases specied above
are possible. After comparing all the minimized values, we nd that case
(d) achieves the minimized V when  = 1.
7. The solution to the relaxed problem is pL = 1, pM =
1
1+ 2 , pH = 0,  = 1,
and V = ((2+) (3+2))
(1+ 2)(1+)2 . Substituting these into the original problem, we
can show that all the constraints are satised. Therefore, this is also the
solution to the original problem.
 case 2: C1 binds
This section covers the case that C1 binds and C5 might bind. We do not assume C1
binds ex ante.
3
We set up the following relaxed problem:
min
pL;pM ;pH ;
1  (( 
1 + 
)2pL + 2

1 + 
1 +   
1 + 
pM + (
1 +   
1 + 
)2pH)
subject to the following constraints:
1. pL  1,
2. 0  pM  1,
3. pH  0,
4. 0    1,
5. C1  0 , pL  (1 + )(1 +   )pH + (1 + )( 1  + 2)pM .
6. C5  0 , pL  (1 + (2 + )  )pH + (   2+ 2   1)pM .
{ Case 2.1:
Parameter Region is 0<  1
2
and  <   
1  , or 1=2<  12( 1 +
p
5) and
 <  < 1 

.
1. We want to show that pL = 1. Suppose not. We can increase pL and pH
and decrease the objective function without violating other constraints.
2. It's easy to show that either C1 or C5 binds. Suppose both are not bind-
ing. We can increase pH without violating other constraints. Here, we rst
consider the case where C1 binds.
3. Suppose 2  1  0. Then MCpM
MCpH
= 2  1
1+  <
2
1+  =
MUpM
MUpH
. Therefore,
pM = 1 or pH = 0. If   (1 + )( 1    + 2), we have pM = 1 and
pH =
+(1+)(1+ 2)
(1+)(1+ )  0. If   (1 + )( 1    + 2), we have pH = 0,
pM =

(1+)( 1 +2)  1.
4. Suppose 2   1 < 0, we have pL = 1, pM = 1, and pH = +(1+)(1+ 2)(1+)(1+ ) .
5. To sum up ,we can show that:
(a) If 0    (1+)(1+)
1+2
, then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH =
+(1+)(1+ 2)
(1+)(1+ ) .
(b) If 1    (1+)(1+)
1+2
, then pL = 1, pH = 0, and pM =

(1+)( 1 +2) .
6. Since in the parameter region specied above (1+)(1+)
1+2
 1, we know that
only case (a) is possible. Hence, pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
+(1+)(1+ 2)
(1+)(1+ ) ,
and V = (1+ )
(1+)(1+)2
. Notice that V is a quadratic function of  which is
maximized at  = 1+
2
.
4
7. Substituting pL, pM , and pL into C5, we have the following constraint on :
( 1  2+ (1 + )
1 +    +

1 + 
)  0;
which is equivalent to
1    2;
where
1 =
1
2
(2 +  + 3+ 2 
p
2(3 + 4) + (4 + 5) + ( + 2)2);
2 =
1
2
(2 +  + 3+ 2+
p
2(3 + 4) + (4 + 5) + ( + 2)2):
Since 1+
2
< 1  1 < 2, we know that V is minimized at  = 1.
8. Next we consider the case that C5 is binding. Using the same method, we
get the minimized value which is larger than the V specied above. Hence,
the solution to the relaxed problem is pL = 1, pM = 1, pH = 1  + ,  = 1,
and V = 
(1+)(1+)2
. Substituting the solution to the original problem, we
show that all the constraints are satised. Hence, this is also the solution
to the original problem.
{ Case 2.2: Parameter Region is 0<  1
2
and 
1     1.
1. pL=1. Suppose not. We can increase pL and pH without violating other
constraints.
2. It is easy to show that either C1 or C5 binds. Suppose both are not bind-
ing. We can increase pH without violating other constraints. Here, we rst
consider the case where C1 binds.
3. Suppose 2      1  0, MCpM
MCpH
= 2  1
1+  <
2
1+  =
MUpM
MUpH
. Therefore,
pM = 1 or pH = 0. If   (1 + )( 1    + 2), we have pM = 1 and
pH =
+(1+)(1+ 2)
(1+)(1+ )  0. If   (1 + )( 1    + 2), we have pH = 0,
pM =

(1+)( 1 +2)  1
4. Suppose 2   1 < 0, we have pL = 1, pM = 1, and pH = +(1+)(1+ 2)(1+)(1+ ) .
5. To sum up ,we can show that:
(a) If 0    (1+)(1+)
1+2
, then pL = 1, pM = 1 and pH =
+(1+)(1+ 2)
(1+)(1+ ) .
(b) If 1    (1+)(1+)
1+2
, then pL = 1, pH = 0, and pM =

(1+)( 1 +2) .
6. Since in the parameter region specied above (1+)(1+)
1+2
 1, we know that
both case (a) and (b) are possible.
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(a) If 0    (1+)(1+)
1+2
, pL = 1, pM = 1, pH =
+(1+)(1+ 2)
(1+)(1+ ) , and
V = (1+ )
(1+)(1+)2
.
Substituting pL, pM , and pL into C5, we have the following constraint:
( 1  2+ (1 + )
1 +    +

1 + 
)  0;
which is equivalent to
1    2;
where
1 =
1
2
(2 +  + 3+ 2 
p
2(3 + 4) + (4 + 5) + ( + 2)2);
2 =
1
2
(2 +  + 3+ 2+
p
2(3 + 4) + (4 + 5) + ( + 2)2):
Taking into account all constraints on , we have the following problem:
min

V =
(1 +   )
(1 + )(1 + )2
such that
0    (1 + )(1 + )
1 + 2
= 3;
1    2:
We can show that if  < 1
4
(3 p8+ 92), or  > 1
4
(3+
p
8+ 92),
then 3 < 1 and the feasible region of  is empty. If
1
4
(3 p8+ 92) 
  1
4
(3 +
p
8+ 92), then 1+
2
< 1    3  1. Since
V is a quadratic function of , it is obvious that V is minimized at
 = 3 =
(1+)(1+)
1+2
, and V = 
2
(1+2)2
:
Here we rearrange the parameter region. We show that if 0    1
and 2
2
1+3
   
1+
, then pL = 1, pM = 1, pH = 0,  =
(1+)(1+)
1+2
, and
V = 
2
(1+2)2
:
(b) If 1    (1+)(1+)
1+2
, we have pL = 1, pH = 0, pM =

(1+)( 1 +2) , and
V =
(1 +   )((1 + )(1 +   ) + (1 +   2)(1 + + ))
(1 + )(1 + )2(1 +   2) :
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Substituting pL, pM , and pL into C5, we have the following constraint:
( + (2 +   2))
(1 + )(1 +   2)  0;
which is equivalent to
0    1 + 
2
or
1
2
(2 +   

)  :
Taking into account all constraints on , we have the following reduced
problem:
min

V =
(1 +   )((1 + )(1 +   ) + (1 +   2)(1 + + ))
(1 + )(1 + )2(1 +   2)
such that
1    (1 + )(1 + )
1 + 2
;
0    1 + 
2
or
1
2
(2 +   

)  :
If 0    22
1+3
, then 1    1
2
(2 +    

). If 
1+
  > 22
1+3
, then
1    (1+)(1+)
1+2
. Since the curve of V is inverse U-shaped, we know
that the minimal can be achieved at  = 1,  = 1
2
(2 +    

), or  =
(1+)(1+)
1+2
. When  = 1, V1 =
(+2+( 1++2))
(1+)( 1+)(1+)2 . When  =
1
2
(2+  

),
V2 =
(+2(3+2) 2(4+3))
4(1+)2( +) . When  =
(1+)(1+)
1+2
, V3 =
2
(1+2)2
.
To sum up, we have following three cases:
i. V1 is chosen when 0 <  < 
 and 0     1 2
2(1+)
+ 1
2
q
1+11+242+163
(1+)2(1+3)
or  <  < 1 and 0     1 8 32
2( 1+2)   12
q
1+16+542+483+254
( 1+2)2 .
ii. V2 is chosen when 
 <  < 1 and  1 8 3
2
2( 1+2)  12
q
1+16+542+483+254
( 1+2)2 <
 < 2
2
1+3
.
iii. V3 is chosen when 0 <  < 
 and  1 2
2(1+)
+ 1
2
q
1+11+242+163
(1+)2(1+3)
<  <

1+
, or  <  < 1 and 
1+
  > 22
1+3
.
Since the solution given in case (b) is superior to that in case (a), the above
solution is the nal solution.
7. Next we consider the case that C5 is binding. Using the same method, we
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get the minimized value which is not smaller than the value for V specied
above. Substituting the solution to the original problem, we show that all
the constraints are satised. Hence, this is also the solution to the original
problem.
Part 2 (The high type mixes). Suppose that the high type mix between the high message
(with probability ) and the low message. The low type only sends the low message. Let
 := q(1 )
1 q be the posterior of facing a high type after the low message. Let  := 1  q be
the probability of low message. The optimal equilibrium is found by solving the following
program.
min
b;pL;pM ;pH ;
2 (1  pL) + 2(1  ) (1  pM) + (1  )2 (1  pH)
subject the ex ante IC* constraint for the for the low type:
((1  pL) ((1  p) + (1  )=2) + pL1
2
) + (1  )((1  pM) (1  p) + pM(1  b))
 ((1  pM) ((1  p) + (1  )
2
) + pM maxfb; ((1  p) + (1  )
2
)g)
+(1  )((1  pH) (1  p) + pH maxf1
2
; (1  p)g)
to the indierence condition for the high type
((1  pM) ( 
2
+ (1  )p) + pMb) + (1  )((1  pH) 
2
+ pH
1
2
) =
((1  pL) ( 
2
+ (1  )p) + pL1
2
) + (1  ) ((1  pM) 
2
+ pM(1  b))
to the high-type ex post constraints:
b  =2 + (1  )p; 1=2  =2; 1=2   
2
+ (1  )p; 1  b  
2
to the low-type ex post constraints:
1  b  (1  p) ; 1=2   (1  p)  + (1  ) =2
and to the probability constraints:
0  pL  1; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1; 0    1:
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But is immediate to note that the constraint set is empty. Indeed, the third high-type ex
post constraint is equivalent to:
 1
2
(1  )    (1  )
1 + (1  )  0;
which cannot be the case for  > .
Part 3 (Both types mix). Suppose that the low type mixes between the low message (with
probability ) and the high message. The high type mixes between the high message (with
probability ) and the low message. Let  := q
1  be the posterior of facing a high type
after the high message. Let  := (1  q) + q(1  ) be the probability of a low message.
Let  := q(1 )

be the posterior of facing a high type after the low message. The optimal
equilibrium solves the following program:
min
b;pL;pM ;pH ;
2 (1  pL) + 2(1  ) (1  pM) + (1  )2 (1  pH)
subject the ex ante IC* constraint for the for the low type:
((1  pL) ((1  p) + (1  )=2) + pL1
2
) + (1  )((1  pM) ((1  p) + (1  )
2
) + pM(1  b))
= ((1  pM) ((1  p) + (1  )=2) + pMb) + (1  )((1  pH) ((1  p) + (1  )
2
) + pH
1
2
)
to the indierence condition for the high type
((1  pM) ( 
2
+ (1  )p) + pMb) + (1  )((1  pH) (
2
+ (1  )p) + pH 1
2
) =
((1  pL) ( 
2
+ (1  )p) + pL1
2
) + (1  ) ((1  pM) (
2
+ (1  )p) + pM(1  b))
to the high-type ex post constraints:
b  =2+ (1  )p; 1=2  =2+ (1 )p; 1
2
  
2
+ (1  )p; 1  b  
2
+ (1 )p
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to the low-type ex post constraints:
1  b   (1  p)  + (1  ) =2; 1=2   (1  p)  + (1  ) =2; b  (1  p) + (1  )
2
1
2
 (1  p) + (1  )
2
and to the probability constraints:
0  pL  1; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1; 0    1; 0    1:
But is immediate to note that the constraint set is empty. Indeed, second and fourth
high-type ex post constraints are equivalent to:
X :=
1
2
(1  ) (+ )  
+ 1    0; Z :=
1
2
(1  )   + 
      0:
Evidently, X  0 requires   
+
, which, in light of  > ; requires  +  > 1. Consider
Z, note that it increases in . When  takes its upper value ;
Z =
1
2
(1  ) (1     ) 
 + (1  )
which is positive if and only if  +   1: This concludes that whenever  >  , either
X < 0 or Z < 0 or both.
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